Eye-tracking based attention bias modification (ET-ABM) facilitates disengagement from negative stimuli in dysphoric individuals by Möbius, M. et al.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-06-01 and may be subject to
change.
Vol:.(1234567890)




Eye-Tracking Based Attention Bias Modification (ET-ABM) Facilitates 
Disengagement from Negative Stimuli in Dysphoric Individuals
Martin Möbius1  · Gina R. A. Ferrari1,2 · Robin van den Bergh1 · Eni S. Becker1 · Mike Rinck1
Published online: 16 January 2018 
© The Author(s) 2018. This article is an open access publication
Abstract
To address shortcomings of purely reaction-time based attention bias modification (ABM) paradigms, a novel eye-tracking 
based ABM training (ET-ABM) was developed. This training targets the late disengagement from negative stimuli and the 
lack of attention for positive information, which are characteristics of depression. In the present study, 75 dysphoric students 
(BDI ≥ 9) were randomly assigned to either this positive training (PT), or a sham-training (ST) that did not train any valence-
specific gaze pattern (positive and negative pictures had to be disengaged from and attended to equally often). Results showed 
that the PT induced a positive attentional bias (longer fixations of positive than negative pictures). Although the ST group 
showed an increase in positive attentional bias as well, this increase was not as strong as in the PT group. Compared to the 
ST, the PT specifically induced faster disengagement from negative pictures. No differential training effects were found 
on stress responses or state rumination. These results show that the ET-ABM successfully modifies attentional processes, 
specifically late disengagement from negative stimuli, in dysphoric students, and hence might be a promising alternative to 
existing ABM paradigms.
Keywords Depression · Attention bias modification · Attentional disengagement · Eye-tracking
Introduction
With more than 300 million people suffering from depres-
sion worldwide, it is amongst the most prevalent mental 
disorders and, according to the World Health Organization 
(WHO 2017), has become the leading cause of disabili-
ties, with a major contribution to the overall global disease 
burden. Despite the variety of existing treatment options 
for depression, relapse rates are high (e.g., about 30% as 
reported in Seemüller et al. 2014), with an increasing risk 
of recurrent depression with each subsequent depressive epi-
sode (Steinert et al. 2014). This suggests that the underlying 
mechanisms which maintain depression are not very well 
understood yet, and hence may not be targeted sufficiently 
by current treatment programs.
A potential cognitive vulnerability factor which is thought 
to maintain depressive symptoms and predispose individu-
als to repeatedly develop new episodes, is the heightened 
attention to depression-relevant, negative information com-
pared to positive information, commonly found in depressed 
individuals (e.g., Armstrong and Olatunji 2012). Research 
making use of eye-tracking technology suggests that in 
depression, this so-called negative attentional bias is specifi-
cally characterized by difficulties with disengaging attention 
from negative stimuli once they have become the focus of 
attention (Sanchez et al. 2013). At the same time, depressed 
individuals show reduced maintained attention to positive 
stimuli, compared to healthy individuals (e.g., Ellis et al. 
2010; Kellough et al. 2008; Sears et al. 2010).
According to cognitive theories of depression, atten-
tional biases play a causal role in both development and 
maintenance of this disorder (Beck 1976; Teasdale 1988). 
As a consequence, computerized training paradigms have 
been developed, aiming at reducing depressive symptoms 
through altering maladaptive information processing ten-
dencies; the so-called cognitive bias modification tech-
niques (CBM; Mathews and MacLeod 2005). The most 
frequently used paradigm for modifying (and measuring) 
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attentional processes is the dot-probe task (MacLeod et al. 
2002). On each trial of this task, two stimuli are presented 
simultaneously on the computer screen, usually a negative 
picture and a positive (or neutral) picture (or word). After 
a short delay, both stimuli disappear and a target replaces 
one of the two stimuli, which participants have to react to. 
Faster reactions to targets replacing negative compared to 
positive stimuli indicate a negative attentional bias. In the 
training version of this task, the targets replace mostly the 
positive (or neutral) stimuli, such that participants’ atten-
tion is selectively trained away from the negative stimuli.
To date, the dot-probe task has mainly been used to 
assess and modify attentional bias in anxious populations 
(for review see Cisler and Koster 2010). Only a few stud-
ies have tried to modify attentional processes in depressed 
individuals, with inconsistent findings so far. While some 
studies managed to reduce the bias toward negative 
stimuli and accordingly the depressive symptoms, many 
other studies failed to modify an attentional bias and to 
replicate the beneficial therapeutic effects on depressed 
mood or symptoms, questioning the efficacy of attentional 
bias modification (ABM) procedures for depression (for 
reviews see Cristea et al. 2015; Mogoaşe et al. 2014). In a 
paper reflecting on the increasing number of ABM failures 
Clarke et al. (2014), however, cautioned against taking the 
absence of evidence in some studies as evidence against 
the theoretical basis of ABM in general. The authors drew 
attention to the fact that most studies that succeeded in 
modifying an attentional bias also induced emotional 
change. By contrast, those studies that failed to modify 
an attentional bias also failed to find beneficial effects on 
mood. This suggests that conventional ABM paradigms 
may not be optimal for reliably modifying and measuring 
attentional bias, and that more research is needed into the 
task conditions under which ABM actually changes atten-
tional processes. According to this argument, more prom-
ising clinical applications of ABM depend on the develop-
ment of more effective attention modification procedures.
One of the most frequently mentioned limitations of 
the dot-probe and other reaction time (RT) based ABM 
paradigms is the low reliability of these tasks (e.g., 
Schmukle 2005; Waechter and Stolz 2015). More impor-
tantly, however, the suitability of the dot-probe task has 
especially been doubted in the context of depression, as 
it is not clear which component of attention is measured 
and trained (Leyman et al. 2007). It has been argued that 
with the longer stimulus durations commonly used in 
depressed populations (Beevers et al. 2015; Wells and 
Beevers 2010), participants may shift their attention back 
and forth between stimuli before the target appears. This 
in turn leaves undetected whether the task is tapping into 
heightened vigilance for negative stimuli or the depres-
sion-characteristic slowed disengagement from negative 
stimuli (for a more thorough discussion of the limitations 
of the dot-probe task, see Ferrari et al. 2016).
Based on the limitations of the dot-probe task and other 
RT-based ABM paradigms, Ferrari et al. (2016) developed 
a new ABM paradigm, incorporating eye-tracking technol-
ogy. This eye-tracking based attentional bias modification 
(ET-ABM) paradigm allows for the continuous assessment 
of eye-movements, and hence for a potentially more reliable 
assessment and training of the specific attentional compo-
nents that are biased in depression. During this ET-ABM 
task, participants are trained to disengage their attention 
from negative pictures and to keep their attention on posi-
tive pictures. On each trial of the task, participants first have 
to fixate a cross on a computer screen, after which two posi-
tively and two negatively valenced pictures are presented 
in a 2 × 2 grid. Importantly, the trial only continues after 
a sufficiently long fixation of a positive picture (1000 ms). 
Hence, if a negative picture replaces the cross, the trial only 
continues when participants look away from the negative 
picture and fixate one of the positive pictures. If a positive 
picture replaces the cross, the pictures disappear when par-
ticipants keep their attention on the fixated positive picture 
or fixate the other positive picture. As soon as a positive 
picture has been fixated for 1000 ms, all pictures disappear 
and a target stimulus is presented at the location of the last 
fixated picture. The target has to be identified by pressing 
a corresponding button. Different from previous RT-based 
ABM paradigms, the training trials in this task only continue 
if participants show the required viewing pattern, tailoring 
the pace of the task to the individuals’ performance.
In a first proof-of principle study (Ferrari et al. 2016) 
with an unselected student sample, this positive training was 
compared to a negative training with the opposite training 
contingencies. Thus, participants were trained to direct their 
gaze to negatively valenced pictures. Results of this first 
study showed that this ET-ABM training is suited to alter 
attentional processes relevant in depression: The positive 
training induced a positive sustained attention bias, that 
is, longer sustained attention to positive than to negative 
pictures. More specifically, it trained participants to more 
quickly disengage their attention from negative stimuli and 
direct their attention to positive pictures. No such changes 
were found in the negative training group. Although the 
training affected mood directly, with the negative group 
showing a stronger increase in negative mood in response 
to the training than the positive group, the training did not 
differentially affect emotional reactions to a subsequent labo-
ratory stressor.
Although this first study provides promising evidence 
that depression-relevant attentional processes can be altered 
by means of this novel ABM paradigm, several questions 
remain to be answered. First, in the previous study, the 
positive training was compared to a negative training in 
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order to maximize group differences, hence it remains to 
be established whether the positive training is also superior 
to a placebo control condition in changing the attentional 
processes. Second, before applying this training in clinically 
depressed populations, it should first be tested whether the 
results can be replicated in a sample with subclinical levels 
of depression, which is assumed to show a stronger pre-
existing negative attentional bias. Finally, training effects in 
the first study were only tested with the same set of stimuli 
as used during the training, leaving it open whether training 
effects are restricted to the specific stimuli being used, or 
whether the attentional processing of positive and negative 
stimuli in general is affected.
Hence, the primary aim of this study was to replicate the 
findings of the previous study in an emotionally vulnerable 
sample, with a sham training as control condition and dif-
ferent stimulus sets in training and assessment. To this end, 
we randomly assigned participants with elevated depression 
scores to one of two training conditions. Half of the partici-
pants received the positive training (PT) in which they were 
trained to direct their gaze away from negative pictures and 
towards positive pictures. The other half received a sham 
training (ST), where no valence-specific gaze patterns were 
reinforced. Importantly, at the beginning of the experiment, 
a negative mood was induced by means of a sad movie. This 
allows for re-activation of otherwise latent depressogenic 
structures in emotionally vulnerable individuals (e.g., Beck 
1967) and hence may serve to elicit a negative attentional 
bias in our sample (for a detailed description of the proce-
dure, see Scher et al. 2005). We expected that, compared to 
participants in the ST, (1) participants in the PT would show 
an increase in positive attentional bias (i.e., relatively longer 
fixations on positive than on negative pictures), and that (2) 
participants in the PT would specifically learn to faster dis-
engage their attention from negative pictures.
To get a first indication of the potential therapeutic effects 
of the training, we additionally explored participants’ mood 
reactivity and recovery in response to a laboratory stressor 
at the end of the experiment. In their eye-tracking experi-
ment, Sanchez et al. (2013) showed that specifically the 
slowed disengagement from negative information is related 
to impaired mood recovery after stress in depressed indi-
viduals. In accordance with these findings, we expected that 
participants in the PT would show better stress recovery than 
participants in the ST.
Methods
Participants
Eighty-four female and 12 male undergraduate students 
(mean age = 21.67, SD = 4.66), of Radboud University 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands, with elevated depression scores 
on Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al. 1996; 
M = 15.57, SD = 7.13) participated in return for course credit 
or 20 €. In order to test participants with at least mild depres-
sive symptoms, we only invited students with BDI-II scores 
higher than 8, which is in line with previous studies (Mas-
tikhina and Dobson 2017; Wells and Beevers 2010). This 
low cutoff score was chosen to maximize sensitivity of the 
BDI-II (Sprinkle et al. 2002). Of 841 students who signed 
up, 96 were invited to the experiment and participated. They 




All of the following questionnaires were administered in the 
participants’ dominant language (i.e., German or Dutch). 
Depression levels were assessed with the revised version 
of Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI-II, Beck et al. 1996). 
The internal consistency of the BDI in the current sample 
was excellent (α = .97). To be able to control for possible 
baseline differences in trait anxiety, the trait subscale of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger 1989) 
was administered. The internal consistency of the STAI was 
excellent (α = .97). Moreover, individual differences in rumi-
native thinking were assessed with the Ruminative Response 
Scale (RRS; Treynor et al. 2003). As the German and the 
Dutch version slightly differ in the number of items, we cal-
culated a mean score instead of a sum score. Both, the Dutch 
and the German version of the RRS showed a good internal 
consistency (Dutch: α = .89; German: α = .86).
Mood State
Throughout the experiment, participants were asked to rate 
their current general mood state (i.e., “How is your mood at 
this moment?”) on a 100 mm Visual Analogue Scale (VAS), 
ranging from 0 (very bad) to 100 (very good). In order to 
assess changes in mood state in response to the stress task, 
we additionally presented Likert scales as used by Sanchez 
et al. (2013). Each Likert scale measured mood with three 
items: happy mood (happy, optimistic, joyful), anxious 
mood (nervous, tense, anxious), and sad mood (depressed, 
upset, sad). All items were rated on a scale ranging from 0 
(not at all) to 10 (very much). One extra item was added to 
assess the tiredness of participants (0 = not at all; 10 = very 
much).
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State Rumination
To assess state rumination in response to the stress task, the 
Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory (MRSI; Mor 
et al. 2013) was administered. The MRSI contains six items, 
measuring momentary self-focused rumination (e.g., “Right 
now, I am thinking about the possible meaning of the way 
I feel”). Items are rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 
“totally not agree” to “totally agree”.
Negative Mood Induction
Negative mood was induced by means of two sequences (i.e., 
20 min in total) of the movie “Sophie’s choice”. The two 
sequences have been shown to effectively induce negative 
mood in previous studies (e.g., Randall and Cox 2001), and 
they have been used before to elicit a negative mood state 




In line with the study of Ferrari et al. (2016), a broad range 
of disorder-nonspecific picture stimuli representing different 
categories (e.g., people, animals, objects; Nencki Affective 
Picture System; Marchewka et al. 2014) was selected. Ninety 
positive and ninety negative pictures (14.3 cm × 10.7 cm) 
were used during the training phase. A further set of 90 
positive and 90 negative pictures was used exclusively dur-
ing the assessment phases, to allow for testing generalization 
of training effects to untrained pictures.
For each phase, training and assessment, 45 picture 
sets were created, always containing two positive and two 
negative pictures matched on content. The pictures were 
arranged in a 2 × 2 grid, which separated the screen into 
four quadrants. The location at which each picture appeared 
(upper/lower and left/right part of the grid) was counterbal-
anced across trials. The stimuli were displayed on a black 
53.2 cm × 29.9 cm computer screen (BenQ XL2420Z), with 
1 cm distance between the pictures. Participants were seated 
about 60 cm away from the screens’ center.
Task Design
The eye-tracking task was adapted from Ferrari et al. (2016) 
and consisted of pre-assessment, training and post-assess-
ment. For a graphic illustration of the task design, see Fig. 1. 
On each trial of the task, a white fixation-cross appeared 
in the middle of one of the four quadrants of the grid. As 
soon as the participant had fixated the cross for 500 ms, it 
disappeared and a set of four pictures was presented. Placing 
the fixation cross into one of the quadrants (instead of the 
screen center) and making sure that it was actually fixated, 
allowed for reliably manipulating which picture was fixated 
first.
The training contained two different types of trials: trials 
on which a negative picture replaced the cross (i.e., negative 
trials) and trials on which a positive picture replaced the 
cross (i.e., positive trials). Participants in the positive train-
ing (PT) had to disengage attention from negative pictures 
and shift it to positive pictures, and to maintain attention 
to positive pictures. On negative trials, participants had to 
look away from the fixated negative picture and fixate one 
of the two positive pictures for 1000 ms. Upon a sufficiently 
long fixation of a positive picture, all pictures disappeared 
and this previously fixated picture was replaced by a probe 
(i.e., an arrow pointing left or right, with the direction of the 
arrow being counterbalanced across picture valence). Par-
ticipants had to identify the direction the arrow was point-
ing to by pressing a computer key, upon which the probe 
disappeared and a new trial started. On positive trials, the 
trial continued only if participants kept looking at the fix-
ated positive picture for 1000 ms, or if they fixated the other 
positive picture in the picture set for 1000 ms.
In the sham training (ST), a different attentional pattern 
was trained, which was independent of the valence of the 
Fig. 1  Schematic overview of the task design. On each trial of the 
positive training (PT), a fixation cross is presented. Upon fixation 
(500 ms), two negative and two positive pictures appear. a The free 
viewing task (assessment) is similar to the training, however, all trials 
last 3000 ms and no probe is presented. b, c Display a sample trial of 
the PT. b On negative (PT: disengagement) trials, participants have 
to disengage their attention from the fixated negative picture and fix-
ate one of the two positive pictures. c On positive (PT: maintained 
attention) trials, attention has to be maintained at the fixated positive 
picture or at the other positive picture. b, c Upon fixation of a posi-
tive picture for 1000 ms, all pictures disappear and an arrow replaces 
the fixated picture. Participants respond to arrow direction by press-
ing a key. The arrow then disappears and a new trial starts. d An 
example of four consecutive trials in the sham training (ST), with the 
first trial requiring a fixation of a picture in the upper right corner. 
On each consecutive trial participants have to fixate a picture in a dif-
ferent corner, while the relevant corner changes in clockwise order 
(2nd trial: lower right corner; 3rd trial: lower left corner; 4th trial: 
upper  left corner). Upon fixation of the picture in the correct corner 
for 1000 ms, all pictures disappear and an arrow replaces the fixated 
picture. Participants respond to arrow direction by pressing a key. The 
arrow then disappears and a new trial starts. Note This figure con-
tains sample images, which have not been used in the current study. 
All images were obtained from Flickr and were published under a 
Creative Commons license. The formats of the images were slightly 
adapted for this figure. Credits: top left, Joe deSousa, CC0 1.0; top 
right, West Point—The U.S. Military Academy, CC BY 2.0; bottom 
left, Steven Depolo, CC BY 2.0; bottom right, bettyx1138, CC BY 
2.0. For license terms see, CC0 1.0 (https://creativecommons.org/
publicdomain/zero/1.0/); CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/2.0/)
▸
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stimuli, such that neither disengagement from negative stim-
uli nor maintained attention to positive stimuli was selec-
tively reinforced. Instead, participants were trained to show 
a clockwise viewing pattern of the presented picture sets. 
This means that, if on the first trial, the picture in the upper 
left part of the grid had to be fixated, the picture in the upper 
right part had to be fixated on the next trial, and the picture 
in the lower right part had to be fixated afterwards, and so 
on. The location of fixation cross, positive and negative pic-
tures was counterbalanced, such that on negative (positive) 
trials, attention had to be disengaged from negative (posi-
tive) pictures as often as it had to be maintained to negative 
(positive) pictures. As in the PT, after a sufficiently long 
fixation of the correct picture, all pictures disappeared and a 
probe replaced the previously fixated picture. In both groups, 
the participants’ gaze pattern thus controlled the appearance 
of the probe. The training contained 270 training trials dis-
tributed across 3 blocks, during which each of the 45 picture 
sets was presented 6 times, in a new random order for each 
participant.
The pre- and post-assessment consisted of a free viewing 
task similar to the training and was introduced to partici-
pants as a calibration procedure. Different from the training, 
all picture sets were presented for 3000 ms, independently 
of participants’ viewing patterns, and no probe followed. 
During assessment, the 45 picture assessment sets were pre-
sented twice (90 trials), once as positive and once as nega-
tive trials. During each assessment-phase, the location of 
the fixation cross was counterbalanced across valences and 
grid positions. The entire task took approximately 45 min, 
depending on how quickly participants learned the required 
viewing patterns.
Fig. 1  (continued)
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Eye-Tracking Device
Monocular gaze data of the dominant eye were obtained at 
a frequency of 500 Hz, by means of the iView X Hi Speed 
system by SMI, a video based eye-tracking system.
Calculation of Attentional Indices
In line with previous studies (Ferrari et al. 2016; Sanchez 
et al. 2013), only fixation durations of at least 100 ms were 
considered. About 1.5 percent of all trials at pre- and post-
assessment were deleted, due to poor tracking quality or 
fixation durations shorter than 100 ms. The remaining trials 
were used to calculate three attentional indices separately 
for pre- and post-assessment: a “sustained attention bias” 
score, reflecting the proportion of the total fixation time on 
positive compared to negative pictures, as well as the two 
relevant attentional components, that is “disengagement 
from negative pictures” (short: negative disengagement) and 
“maintained attention to positive pictures” (short: positive 
maintained attention).
The sustained attention bias score was calculated in line 
with Ferrari et al. (2016): In the first step, we calculated two 
sum scores per trial, reflecting the total time participants fix-
ated positive and negative pictures. Based on these scores, 
medians were calculated for each participant, representing 
the median fixation time on positive and negative pictures. In 
the last step, we calculated the bias score: (Median fixation 
time on positive pictures)/(median fixation time on positive 
pictures + median fixation time on negative pictures). Scores 
larger than 0.5 are indicative of a more positive sustained 
attention bias (relatively longer fixations on positive pic-
tures), while scores smaller than 0.5 are indicative of a more 
negative sustained attention bias.
Negative disengagement scores and positive maintained 
attention scores were derived from negative and positive 
trials respectively. We calculated the median fixation dura-
tion on the first (positive or negative) picture until the first 
attentional shift to (and fixation of) one of the pictures of 
the opposite valence. Hence, on negative trials, longer fixa-
tion durations on negative pictures reflect a slower negative 
disengagement, while on positive trials, longer fixation dura-
tions on positive pictures reflect prolonged positive main-
tained attention.
Stress Task
In line with the study by Ferrari et al. (2016), we used an 
adapted speech task by Amir et al. (2008), in order to inves-
tigate training effects on emotional reactivity in response to 
a laboratory stressor. Via the computer, participants were 
informed that they would get 1 min to prepare a 3-min-
speech on the topic “Why am I a good friend”. This topic 
has previously been used to assess the association between 
negative mood recovery after stress and attentional bias in 
depressed individuals (Sanchez et al. 2013). Participants 
were informed that their speech would be video-recorded so 
that it later can be evaluated on its quality by two independ-
ent researchers. To increase stress levels, participants were 
not allowed to take any notes during preparation and a clock 
on the computer screen signaled how much time was left. 
After 1 min, a “beep” sound occurred. The experimenter 
then entered the room, started the video-recording, asked 
participants to deliver their speech into a webcam, and left. 
After 3 min, the experimenter entered the room, stopped 
the video recording and left again for a 5-min resting phase. 
Participants were instructed to sit down quietly and relax. 
A clock on the screen again signaled the time left of the 
resting phase.
Procedure
Prior to the experimental procedure, potential participants 
were pre-screened by means of the BDI via an online screen-
ing system of Radboud University Nijmegen. Only individu-
als with a score higher than 8 were invited for participation 
in the experiment, which took place within one week after 
pre-screening. These participants were tested individually 
in a cubicle of the Behavioural Science Institute of the Uni-
versity. After providing informed consent, they were ran-
domly assigned in a double-blind fashion to one of the two 
training conditions (i.e., PT or ST). The experimenter then 
determined the participants’ dominant eye and subsequently 
calibrated the eye-tracker. Next, participants were seated in 
front of a computer, where they filled in the baseline ques-
tionnaires and mood state measures (T0: baseline). These 
measures were followed by a negative mood induction to re-
activate the latent depressogenic schemas of the dysphoric 
sample (e.g., Beck 1967), before we assessed mood state a 
second time (T1: pre-training). Participants were then seated 
in front of the eye-tracker, where a brief calibration proce-
dure was started, which was followed by pre-assessment, 
training and post-assessment of the ET-ABM task. If nec-
essary, the calibration procedure was repeated before each 
training block and post-assessment. Afterwards, participants 
were again seated in front of the other computer, where the 
stress task was presented. Throughout this task, participants 
were asked to rate their mood state on the VAS scales: at 
the beginning of the task (T2: pre-stress), after the speech 
instructions were provided (T3: anticipatory stress), retro-
spectively during the speech (T4: during stress), after speech 
delivery (T5: post-stress), and after the 5-min resting period 
(T6: recovery). In addition to the VAS scales, we presented 
the Likert mood-scales at T2 (pre-stress), at T3 (anticipa-
tory stress), and at T5 (post-stress). To assess possible train-
ing effects on state rumination, the MRSI was administered 
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directly after the resting period. After having filled in the 
questionnaire, a sequence of a happy movie (Jungle book) 
was shown to elevate participants’ mood, followed by a final 
mood rating (VAS scale; T7). At the end of the experiment, 
participants filled in an awareness check, where we asked 
them to indicate on a 100 mm VAS scale, in how far they felt 
able to exert control on the eye-tracking task. Finally, par-
ticipants were compensated for participation and debriefed. 
The entire procedure took about 120 min.
Results
Preliminary Analyses and Group Characteristics
In the analyses, we included only participants for whom both 
pre-assessment and post-assessment data of the eye-tracking 
task were available (n = 96). Of those, 13 participants had 
to be excluded from the analyses because of a BDI score 
lower than 9. Another 3 participants were excluded due 
to a lack of task adherence, and another 5 due to extreme 
values on the eye-tracking indices (i.e., data points more 
than 1.5 interquartile ranges below the first or above the 
third quartile). Due to skewness of the data, the attentional 
indices “negative disengagement” and “positive maintained 
attention” were log-transformed. Due to missing data of 
23 participants on a single item of the Likert mood scales, 
we calculated means scores per participant instead of sum 
scores. The resulting groups (PT: n = 40, ST: n = 35), did 
not differ on any of the trait variables (p > .6) or mood state 
(p = .95) at baseline. Moreover, the groups did not differ 
on any of the demographic variables besides gender, with 
significantly more men in the PT (8 males) than in the ST 
(1 male), χ2(75) = 5.2, p = .023 (see Table 1). A manipula-
tion check of the mood induction showed that VAS scores 
dropped from before to after the negative mood induction 
procedure, F(1, 72) = 140.04, p < .001, η2 = .66, similarly for 
both groups, F(1, 72) = .04, p = .839.
Attentional Processes at Baseline
Sustained Attention Bias
A univariate ANOVA of the sustained attention bias at the 
pre-assessment revealed no significant group difference, F(1, 
73) = .54, p = .466. A subsequent one-sample t-test indicated 
that the bias score did not deviate significantly from zero, 
indicating that before the training, participants had neither 
a tendency to attend towards positive nor towards negative 
pictures, t(74) = 1.11, p = .271.
Positive Maintained Attention and Negative 
Disengagement
Two separate ANOVAs comparing the log-transformed 
attentional indices between the two groups, showed that 
PT and ST group did not differ from each other regarding 
Table 1  Group differences on demographic variables and baseline 
questionnaires
RRS scores of two participants were missing
PT positive training, ST sham training, BDI-II Becks Depression 
Inventory  Second Edition, STAI-T Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inven-
tory, RRS Ruminative Response Scale
PT (n = 40) ST (n = 35)
Age 21.18 (2.36) 21 (2.76) t(73) = 0.3, p = .771
Gender χ2(1) = 5.2, p = .023
 Male 8 1
 Female 32 34
Nationality χ2(1) = 0.14, p = .711
 Dutch 20 19
 German 20 16
BDI-II 17.53 (6.44) 16.64 (6.25) t(73) = 0.73, p = .654
STAI-T 49.4 (9.33) 51.29 (9.82) t(73) = 0.85, p = .952
RRS 2.3 (0.56) 2.14 (0.53) t(71) = 1.29, p = .762
Table 2  Mean fixation times 
(with standard deviations) in 
milliseconds during the free 
viewing task, and the resulting 
attentional bias scores
Sustained attention bias score: Proportion of fixation time on positive pictures compared to negative pic-
tures; Disengagement from negative pictures: Latency of the first shift from a negative picture until fixation 
of a positive picture; Maintained attention for positive pictures: Latency of the first shift from a positive 
picture until fixation of a negative picture
PT positive training, ST sham training
PT ST
Pre-training Post-training Pre-training Post-training
Fixation time on positive pictures 1434 (270) 1797 (400) 1499 (273) 1658 (402)
Fixation time on negative pictures 1413 (301) 1000 (373) 1378 (281) 1189 (372)
Sustained attention bias score 0.51 (0.1) 0.64 (0.13) 0.52 (0.1) 0.58 (0.13)
Disengagement from negative pictures 711 (217) 555 (169) 643 (178) 745 (342)
Maintained attention for positive pictures 624 (202) 802 (531) 595 (160) 801 (408)
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the attentional components at baseline (positive maintained 
attention: F(1, 74) = 0.26, p = .612; negative disengagement: 
F(1, 74) = 1.71, p = .195). A subsequent paired-samples 
t-test revealed that at baseline, participants showed slower 
disengagement from negative pictures than from positive 
pictures, t(74) = 3.09, p = .003, d = .33. For descriptives, see 
Table 2.
Training Effects on Attentional Processes
Changes in Sustained Attention Bias
A 2 (group: PT, ST) × 2 (time: pre, post) repeated-measures 
(RM) ANOVA of the sustained attention bias scores revealed 
a main effect of time, F(1, 73) = 92.18, p < .001, η2 = .56, 
which was moderated by the training, F(1, 73) = 14.64, 
p < .001, η2 = .17. As indicated by a subsequent paired-
samples t-test, both groups showed an increase in sustained 
attention bias for positive pictures (PT: t(39) = 9.46, p < .001, 
d = 1.54; ST: t (34) = 4.21, p < .001, d = .76). The PT, how-
ever, showed a stronger bias after the training than the ST, 
t(73) = 2.83, p = .041, d = .48. For means, see Table 2.
Changes in Maintained Attention and Negative 
Disengagement
A 2 (group: PT, ST) × 2 (time: pre, post) × 2 (valence: 
positive, negative) RM ANOVA on the log-transformed 
attentional indices revealed a marginally significant effect of 
time, F(1, 73) = 3.12, p = .081, η2 = .04, which was moder-
ated by valence, F(1, 73) = 27.17, p < .001, η2 = .27, as well 
as by group, F(1, 73) = 8.14, p = .005, η2 = .1. Importantly, 
the crucial 3-way interaction was significant as well, 
F(1, 73) = 8.94, p = .004, η2 = .11 indicating that the two 
groups showed differential changes in positive maintained 
attention and negative disengagement. Subsequent paired-
samples t-tests revealed that participants in the PT learned to 
disengage more quickly from negative pictures, t(39) = 4.78, 
p < .001, d = .73, and to longer fixate positive pictures, 
t(39) = 2.11, p = .041, d = .36. Participants in the ST became 
generally slower with disengaging attention from both types 
of pictures (positive maintained attention: t(34) = 3.56, 
p = .001, d = .69; negative disengagement: t(34) = 2.13, 
p = .041, d = .36). While at pre-assessment, participants 
had the tendency to disengage from negative pictures more 
slowly than from positive pictures, this bias disappeared at 
post-assessment in the ST, t(34) = 0.47, p = .639, and was 
even reversed in the PT, t(39) = 3.48, p = .001, d = .57. See 
Table 2 for untransformed scores of the eye-tracking indices.
Training Effects on Mood
Direct Effects on Mood
An independent-samples t-test on the VAS revealed that PT 
and ST did not differ in mood state right before the training, 
t(73) = 0.18, p = .859. A subsequent 2 (group: PT, ST) × 2 
(time: pre-assessment, post-assessment) RM ANOVA of the 
VAS revealed a recovery from the negative mood induction 
procedure during the training, F (1, 72) = 106.96, p < .001, 
η2 = .6, which was not significantly different for the two 
groups, F (1, 72) = 1.3, p = .257. For means and SDs, see 
Table 3.
Table 3  Mean mood scores (with standard deviations) for all assessment points
PT positive training, ST sham training, VAS Visual Analogue Scale of general mood state, Likert Likert mood scales = happy mood (items: 
happy, optimistic, joyful), anxious mood (items: nervous, tense, anxious), sad mood (items: depressed, upset, sad), T1 pre-training directly after 
the negative mood induction, Pre-stress directly after the training




T5: post-stress T6: recovery T7: mood 
induction
PT
 VAS 56.85 (19.6) 27.95 (17.14) 56.63 (14.92) 48.24 (23.41) 46.76 (24.72) 56.42 (22.37) 55.71 (17.69) 68.18 (17.27)
Likert
 Happy – – 6.26 (1.48) 6 (1.84) – 5.89 (1.62) – –
 Anxious – – 3.64 (1.47) 4.66 (2.36) – 3.88 (2.2) – –
 Sad – – 3.58 (1.54) 3.86 (1.84) – 3.4 (1.88) –
ST
 VAS 57.15 (21.33) 27.24 (17.13) 48.53 (16.87) 44.56 (22.71) 39.81 (25.95) 49.06 (20.06) 50.84 (16.34) 65.28 (18.86)
Likert
 Happy – – 5.42 (1.89) 5.39 (2.14) – 5.41 (2.05) – –
 Anxious – – 4.07 (2.14) 5.25 (2.36) – 4.24 (2.47) – –
 Sad – – 3.88 (1.84) 4.18 (2.28) – 3.53 (2.11) – –
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Effects on Mood Reactivity and Recovery 
in Response to Stress
VAS
A 2 (group: PT, ST) × 4 (time: pre-speech, announcement, 
during-speech, post-speech) RM ANOVA on the VAS, 
revealed a significant time effect, F(3, 66) = 9.7, p < .001, 
η2 = .31. Within-subject contrasts revealed that the speech 
task had its intended effects: The announcement of the 
task resulted in a drop in mood, F(1, 68) = 6.16, p = .016, 
η2 = .08, which remained low during the speech task, 
F(1,68) = 2.61, p = .111, while mood increased again after 
the speech task, F(1, 68) = 28.78, p < .001, η2 = .3. For 
means, see Table 3. However, the crucial time-by-group 
interaction was not significant, F(3, 66) = 0.46, p = .710, 
indicating that PT and ST did not differentially affect 
mood reactivity or recovery in response to the stress task.
Likert Scales
The 2 (group: PT, ST) × 4 (time: pre-speech, announce-
ment, during-speech, post-speech) RM ANOVA was 
repeated for each of the three Likert scales (i.e., hap-
piness, anxiety and sadness). While happiness ratings 
remained unaffected by the speech task, F(2, 67) = 0.7 
p = .449, anxiety and sadness ratings changed through-
out the speech task (Anxiety: F(2,67) = 14.25, p < .001, 
η2 = .3; Sadness: F(2,67) = 10.03, p < .001, η2 = .23). 
Inspection of the means suggests that anxiety and sadness 
increased in response to the announcement (Anxiety: T2 
M = 3.84 (SD = 1.8), T3 M = 4.93 (SD = 2.36); Sadness: 
T2 M = 3.72 (SD = 1.68), T3 M = 4.01 (SD = 2.05)), and 
dropped again after the speech task (Anxiety: T5 M = 4.05 
(SD = 2.32); Sadness T5 M = 3.46 (SD = 1.97)). However, 
in line with the analysis of the VAS, the crucial interac-
tion effect was not significant, suggesting that changes in 
mood in response to the speech task did not differ between 
groups (Anxiety: F(2, 67) = 0.19, p = .827; Sadness: F(2, 
67) = 0.32, p = .73).
Training Effects on State‑Rumination
We compared MRSI scores after the stress task between 
the two groups by means of an independent-samples t-test. 
This analysis revealed no significant training effect on state 
rumination (PT: M = 20.32 (SD = 6.85); ST: M = 21.91 
(SD = 6.69); t(86) = 0.98, p = .332).
Contingency Awareness
The awareness check revealed that relatively more partici-
pants in the PT became aware of the training contingency 
than in the ST, 55% versus 12%; χ2(74) = 15.07, p < .001. 
Moreover, participants in the PT reported more perceived 
control over the eye-tracking task than participants in the 
ST, t(73) = 3.98, p < .001. Therefore, we repeated the main 
analysis with awareness as an additional between-subjects 
factor. The 2 (group: PT, ST) × 2 (time: pre, post) × 2 (con-
tingency awareness: yes, no) RM ANOVA of the sustained 
attention bias revealed no 3-way interaction effect involv-
ing awareness, F(1, 70) = 2.66, p = .107. The 2 (group: PT, 
ST) × 2 (time: pre, post) × 2 (valence: positive, negative) × 2 
(contingency awareness: yes, no) RM ANOVA on the log-
transformed attention bias indices did not indicate a signifi-
cant 4-way interaction with awareness either, F(1,70) = 3.36, 
p = .071.
Discussion
To address the limitations of previously used RT-based 
ABM paradigms, a novel ABM paradigm based on eye-
tracking was recently developed (i.e., the ET-ABM; Fer-
rari et al. 2016). This paradigm was specifically designed to 
assess and target the attentional components that are biased 
in depression: the disengagement from negative stimuli and 
the maintained attention to positive stimuli. A first proof-of 
principle study with healthy students showed that, compared 
to a negative training version, the ET-ABM can induce a 
positive sustained attention bias as well as faster disengage-
ment from negative stimuli. The aim of the present study 
was to replicate these promising findings in an emotionally 
vulnerable sample of dysphoric students, with a placebo 
sham-training as control condition.
In line with the findings of Ferrari et al. (2016), the PT 
induced a positive sustained attention bias (i.e., longer fixa-
tions on positive than on negative stimuli). Notably, both PT 
and ST showed an increase in positive sustained attention 
bias. However, this increase was stronger in the PT group, 
supporting the effectiveness of the training in modifying 
attentional processes in dysphoric individuals. As in the 
previous study, these general training effects were again 
driven by reduced disengagement latencies from negative 
stimuli in the PT group. Beyond that, the PT group also 
showed an increase in maintained attention to the first fix-
ated positive pictures, suggesting that the training may also 
affect the initial processing of positive stimuli. In contrast, 
the ST did not induce any valence-specific attentional view-
ing patterns. Instead, participants in this group became 
generally slower with directing their gaze away from the 
initially fixated pictures, resulting in slower disengagement 
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from both negative and positive pictures. Summarizing, 
while the PT was effective in reversing an initially negative 
attentional bias into a positive attentional bias, character-
ized by relatively longer fixations on positive pictures and 
by relatively quicker disengagement from negative pictures, 
the ST resulted in a decline of the negative bias. A potential 
explanation for the observed effect in the ST group might be 
that the ST was possibly more difficult than the PT. Remark-
ably, more participants in the PT became aware of the rein-
forced training pattern, and the PT group experienced a 
stronger feeling of control over the task. It is likely that 
the ST therefore was more tiring than the PT, resulting in 
slower latencies in general.
In a previous study (Ferrari et al. 2016), the PT did not 
modify initial maintained attention to positive pictures. It 
had been suggested that the temporal criteria defining a 
fixation as sufficiently long to continue a training trial (i.e., 
1000 ms) might not be appropriate to induce “longer” main-
tained attention to positive stimuli. As our main goal was 
to replicate the earlier training effects on general sustained 
attention and attentional disengagement from negative stim-
uli, we did not increase the required fixation duration on 
positive pictures. Nevertheless, in the current study, training 
effects were partially driven by the increased initial main-
tained attention to positive stimuli. This might be explained 
by the different stimulus sets used in the two studies. In the 
previous study, negative and positive pictures were matched 
on their valence ratings, whereas this was not done in the 
current study. As a result, more extreme positive and nega-
tive pictures might have been presented during the training, 
which possibly resulted in a better contrast between these 
valences. This change in contrast might have helped par-
ticipants to more easily identify the two different responses 
required to react to the two different picture types, resulting 
in the modification of both indices, disengagement from neg-
ative pictures and maintained attention to positive pictures. 
Although this explanation remains speculative, the current 
findings provide promising evidence that the ET-ABM may 
actually directly tap into both components of attention that 
are relevant in depression. Importantly, as different picture 
sets were used during training and assessments, we may 
further conclude that the observed training effects are not 
merely the result of stimulus-specific response patterns, 
but reflect a modified attentional processing of emotionally 
valenced information in general.
To get a first indication of the potential therapeutic effects 
of the ET-ABM, we additionally explored changes in mood. 
In contrast to the first study, the PT and ST did not differ-
entially affect participants’ mood state. In general, positive 
mood increased indistinguishably in both groups from before 
to after the training, possibly pointing to recovery from the 
negative mood induction at the beginning of the experiment. 
More importantly, the training did not affect mood changes 
during the stress task either. In line with the previous study 
(Ferrari et al. 2016), PT and ST groups did not differ in their 
mood reactivity or recovery from the speech challenge. It 
was therefore speculated that stress-attenuating effects of 
the training may be restricted to emotionally vulnerable sam-
ples, as suggested by previous CBM research (Becker et al. 
2016). Our sample did consist of individuals with elevated 
depression scores. Hence, one possible interpretation of our 
results may be that in depression, the modification of atten-
tional processes does not affect mood reactivity or recovery.
In the context of anxiety, the link between attentional bias 
and emotional vulnerability has been investigated in a range 
of studies (for a review, see Clarke et al. 2014), whereas 
only a few studies have addressed this topic in depression. 
Although Sanchez et  al. (2013) did not experimentally 
manipulate attentional processes, they found that slower 
disengagement from negative stimuli predicted lower mood 
recovery after stress. Together with the few studies show-
ing that reducing a negative attentional bias may attenuate 
depressive symptoms (Browning et al. 2012; Wells and 
Beevers 2010; Yang et al. 2014), this provides evidence 
supporting a causal link between attentional bias and main-
tenance of depressed mood. It is important to note here, that 
the latter studies all made use of multiple training sessions, 
distributed over a longer period of time. However, given 
the limited number of studies and the contradicting conclu-
sions from meta-analyses regarding number of sessions as a 
moderator of training effects (Beard et al. 2012; Cristea et al. 
2015; Hallion and Ruscio 2011; Mogoaşe et al. 2014), it 
remains to be investigated whether training effects on stress 
reactivity and recovery, or even depressive symptoms, can 
be achieved by increasing the number of training sessions.
Moreover, we would like to emphasize that the stress task 
employed in this study may not be optimal for measuring 
transfer effects of the training to mood responses, which 
might be the reason why we found no relation between 
attentional processing and emotional reactivity. Although 
Sanchez et al. (2013) found a significant association of 
slow disengagement from negative stimuli with lower mood 
recovery after a speech challenge as used in our study, one 
may question whether a performance-related speech-chal-
lenge can be considered a relevant stressor in the context 
of depression. In fact, the link with attentional processes 
was exclusively found for “sad” mood recovery. Hence, 
before drawing firm conclusions about the causal role of 
attentional bias in depressed mood, future research should 
consider to increase the number of training sessions and 
investigate its effect on mood recovery after a depression-
relevant stressor. Such a stressor could for instance involve 
a video-clip that induces sad mood, as used at the beginning 
of our experiment.
Subsequent studies using this paradigm might also want 
to include other measurement instruments that can detect 
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far transfer effects. Even though this study administered a 
free-viewing assessment task with different pictures than 
used during training, the free-viewing task shares several 
characteristics with the training paradigm. To rule out that 
only a single task-relevant component has been trained, we 
recommend to make additional use of alternative bias meas-
ures, such as a spatial-cueing task (Baert et al. 2010) or the 
engagement-disengagement eye-tracking task by Sanchez 
et al. (2013). Moreover, as the current study does not allow 
to attribute training effects to either of the two attentional 
components (i.e., negative disengagement or positive main-
tained attention), follow-up studies are required to disen-
tangle the specific working mechanism of the ET-ABM. 
Finally, a measurement-only control condition might be a 
useful addition for future research, as sham-training pro-
cedures as implemented in this study may have training 
unspecific effects as well (e.g., Gladwin 2017; Wells and 
Beevers 2010).
For these follow-up studies, we would strongly recom-
mend to take all three attentional components into account 
(i.e., sustained attention, negative disengagement, positive 
maintained attention). The current study found no sustained 
attention bias at baseline, which might have been expected 
based on the extensive literature on the existence of nega-
tive attentional biases in depression (e.g., Peckham et al. 
2010). However, the fact that we found a slower disengage-
ment from negative than from positive pictures points to the 
importance of looking into the different attentional com-
ponents separately, rather than exclusively investigating a 
general bias. Differentiating between negative disengage-
ment and positive maintained attention may allow for a more 
sensitive measurement of attentional bias in depression.
To summarize, this study provides further support for 
the effectiveness of the ET-ABM in modifying the specific 
attentional components assumed to be causally involved in 
the development and maintenance of depression. In order 
to investigate whether ABM can indeed alleviate emotional 
vulnerability, it has been suggested that we need refined 
or new paradigms which reliably assess and modify these 
processes (Clarke et al. 2014). This study suggests that the 
ET-ABM task may indeed be such a paradigm that facili-
tates further progress in this field of research. Fortunately, 
the technical developments of the past decade made eye-
tracking devices accessible at reasonable prices and suitable 
for the use in hospitals without requiring the expertise of 
technicians. Therefore, the next step should be to investigate 
the beneficial effects of the ET-ABM on clinically relevant 
measures in a patient sample.
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